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China has experienced dramatic social transformation over the past 40  years of reform and 
opening up. While achieving tremendous economic achievements, China is also facing a series 
of challenges due to the complexity of social governance. Advancement among state institu-
tions reform of China since 2014 is part of the aforementioned social transformation process. 
The institutional reform involves changes in the powers of the legislature, executive and judicial 
organs, which promotes the formation of a new state organ system and directly leads to the 
2018 constitutional amendment. The issue of constitutional limits for the reform of state institu-
tions has aroused widespread concern in academia. The Constitution contains various regula-
tory bases for institutional reforms. Some of the reforms are clearly bound by the Constitution, 
some are restricted by its general provisions, and some transcend the framework of power dis-
tribution defined in the Constitution. In practice, institutional reforms involve three strategies in 
response to the Constitution. First, compliance with the Constitution. Second, deviation from 
the Constitution and promotion of constitutional amendments. Third, deviation from the Con-
stitution with avoidance of constitutional adjustment. This article holds the view that over the 
course of social transformation, reforms have to remain current while improving the Constitu-
tion. Nevertheless, the Constitution that provides the authoritative structure and stable expec-
tation for the state and its citizens shall not be neglected. Any major systemic reform with regard 
to the Constitution must adhere to formal constitutionality as the primary foundation.
Keywords: institutional reforms, constitutional amendment, formal constitutionality, institutional 
transformation.
Since 2014, China has begun a new round of  institutional reforms in a comprehen-
sive and systemic manner1. The ongoing institutional reforms involve modifications to 
the judicial system, the national supervisory system, the national security system, the 
national legislative system, the audit system, and so on. In general, these institutional 
modifications have ceased to be restricted to reforms that target the internal management 
mechanism of any single state agency. Instead, institutional reforms are comprised of 
major adjustments made to the overall power distribution among different types of state 
agencies, and the subordination among the state agencies at different levels. Some re-
1 《中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定》（2013年11月中共十八届三中全会通过） [Deci-
sion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Some Major Issues Concerning Com-
prehensively Deepening the Reform is a prelude to a new round of institutional reforms in China. (Adopted 
at the 3rd Session of the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress in November 2013)].
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form measures in the Constitution have already had material impact on the basic structure 
of state power. Efforts are being made to deepen these reforms, as the power distribu-
tion among state agencies is undergoing radical changes. Two important questions arise 
in this context: how can success in reforming state agencies be ensured in accordance 
with the Constitution; and how can the constitutional text be made to respond positively 
to practical needs from the state institutional reform through interpretation and modifica-
tion? These represent the major theoretical and practical issues inherent in constitutional 
research, and the ongoing institutional reforms have attracted widespread attention from 
constitutional scholars2. The conflict of “deviation and amendment” between the Consti-
tution and its reform is highlighted by these institutional reforms.
In March 2018, China’s current constitution was amended for the fifth time. The 
number of constitutional amendments has reached fifty-two. Among the twenty-one new 
amendments, seven are made to the Preamble and General Principle, while the remaining 
fourteen are all concerned with institutional reforms. Constitutional amendments partly 
answered and addressed the issue of the constitutional basis for institutional reform. How-
ever, with regard to the ongoing changes directed at state agencies, closer consideration 
of the relationship between the Constitution and the reforms is required.
This article starts with an analysis of the constitutional basis for reforms to dif-
ferent types of state agencies and the boundaries set by the Constitution for those 
reforms before and after the Amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic 
of China (2018) were enacted. Then, based on the summary of the institutional reforms 
in practice, this paper provides an analysis of three response strategies devised by the 
reformers for the constitutional text. Finally, based on the analysis of the first two parts, 
the paper offers support for state adherence to the foundation of formal constitutionality 
and the promotion of institutional reforms within the framework of the Constitution and 
its laws, so as to maintain the authority and stability of the Constitution over the course 
of institutional reform enforcement.
1. Institutional reforms and their constitutional regulatory bases
Prior to the current constitution being amended in March 2018, Article 3 stipulated 
that, “All administrative, judicial and procuratorial agencies at the state level are estab-
lished by the People’s Congresses to which they are held accountable and by which they 
are supervised”. The structure of state power under the system of the People’s Con-
gress was established by the 1954 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and 
inherited by the 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China3. After more than 
half a century of smooth operation, the structure of power distribution has undergone 
adjustment. After amendment was made in 2018, the term “supervisory” was added 
to Article 3, “All administrative, supervisory, judicial, and procuratorial agencies at the 
2 For example, in November 2016, the Department of Politics and Law of the Party School of the Cen-
tral Committee of the CPC hosted an academic seminar on “Implementation of the Constitution, Judicial 
Reform and Modernization of National Governance”; In January 2017, the Institute of Law of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences held an academic seminar on “Reform of the State Supervisory System”; In 
February 2017, the editorial department of Global Law Review hosted a seminar on “Reform of the Supervi-
sory System and the Rule of Law”; In April 2017, the China Institute of Constitutional Law hosted a seminar 
on “Constitutional Basis for the Reform of the State Supervisory System”; In May 2018, the China University 
of Political Science and Law hosted a seminar on “The National Institutional Reform and the Development 
of Public Law”.
3 See: 朱福惠. “五四宪法”与国家机构体系的形成与创新//中国法学. 2014. №  4.页48 [Zhu Fuhui. 
The 1954 Constitution and Formation and Innovation of National Institution System // China Legal Science. 
2004. No. 4. P. 48].
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state level are established by the People’s Congress to which they are held accountable 
and by which they are supervised”. In Chapter III titled “the Structure of the State”, the 
original 79 articles in seven sections have been amended to 84 articles in eight sections, 
with the addition of a section titled “Supervisory Commissions”. After the amendment 
to the Constitution, reforms, such as the one to the national supervisory system, have 
provided the basis for constitutional norms. However, in practice, institutional reforms 
have encountered a scenario where the constitutionality of those reforms was required 
before and after the amendment was made to the Constitution in 2018.
1.1. The plan for reform is clearly inconsistent with the Constitution. The re-
form to the national supervisory system was initiated at the end of 2016. The relevant func-
tions performed by the agencies responsible for the investigation and handling of cor-
ruption and bribery, dereliction of duty, and prevention of abuse-of-power crimes, such 
as the supervisory department (or bureau) of the People’s government, the bureau of 
corruption prevention and procuratorate (prosecutor general), are uniformly assigned to 
the supervisory commissions established by the People’s Congress at the corresponding 
levels. The application of the relevant provisions of the Administrative Supervision Law of 
the People’s Republic of China, the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, the Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates of the People’s Republic of China, 
Public Procurators Law of the People’s Republic of China, and Organization Law of the 
People’s Republic of China for Local People’s Congresses at All Levels and Local Peo-
ple’s Governments at All Levels has been superseded on a temporary basis in the pilot 
areas4. According to the pilot plan, reform to the state supervisory system will transform 
the power structure and put in place a new structure of state institutions5.
One of the core reforms to the national supervisory system is the transfer of power 
from administrative supervision as exercised by the government to a newly-established 
supervisory commission. Despite the absence of regulation of this supervisory com-
mission in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982), the notion of “jian 
cha” is referred to in two places, namely, in Article 89 on the functions and powers of 
the State Council and in Article 107  on administrative work undertaken by local gov-
ernments. “Supervision” is referred to as part of the administrative work performed 
by the government6. In the current constitution, the notion of “jian du” is mentioned in 
seventeen places7. The terms “jian cha” and “jian du” are both translated into English 
as “supervision”. Despite only minor differences in the Chinese context, there is a clear 
4 《全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于在北京市、山西省、浙江省开展国家监察体制改革试点工作的
决定》（2016年12月十二届全国人大常委会第二十五次会议通过) [Decision of the Standing Committee of 
the National People’s Congress on Carrying out the Pilot Program of Reforming the National Supervision 
Mechanism in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Province. (Adopted at the 25th Session 
of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth National People’s Congress on December 25, 2016)].
5 马怀德.《国家监察法》的立法思路与立法重点//环球法律评论. 2017. № 2.页 9 [Ma Huaide. Legis-
lative Ideas and Key Points of the State Supervision Law // Global Law Review. 2017. Vol. 39, No. 2. P. 9].
6 Article 89 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China regulates, “The State Council ex-
ercises the following functions and powers: <…> (8) to direct and administer civil affairs, public security, 
judicial administration, supervision, and other related matters”; Article 107 regulates, “Local people’s gov-
ernments at or above the county level, within the limits of their authority as prescribed by law, conduct 
administrative work concerning the economy, education, science, culture, public health, physical culture, 
urban and rural development, finance, civil affairs, public security, nationalities affairs, judicial administra-
tion, supervision, and family planning in their respective administrative areas; issue decisions and orders; 
appoint or remove administrative functionaries, train them, appraise their performance and reward or pun-
ish them”.
7 They are People’s supervision (Paragraph 2 of Article 3 and Paragraph 2 of Article 27), the National 
People’s Congress Supervision (Paragraph 3 of Article 3, Paragraph 2 of Article 62, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of 
Article 67, and Article 104), market supervision, (Paragraph 2 of Article 11), election supervision (Article 
77 and Article 102), the audit supervision (Paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 691, and Article 109), the internal 
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distinction in the common literal interpretation8 and in the practical effect of reform on 
the Constitution. The implication of “jian du” is broader, and it encompasses all kinds 
of power control, such as investigation, supervision, and restriction. In comparison, the 
application of “jian cha” is more clearly defined, referring exclusively to administrative 
supervision. Prior to the 2018  amendment, the Constitution restricted the term “jian 
cha” to the concept of administrative authority of the state council and local govern-
ments, which implies a constitutional intention of equating “jian cha” with “administrative 
supervision”.
This conforms to the establishment of state agencies in China. The Common 
Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference was launched on 
September 27, 1949. Article 19 stated that,
People’s supervisory agencies shall be established in the People’s Governments at coun-
ty and municipal levels or above to scrutinize the performance of duties by the state agencies at 
various levels and by public organizations of all types and to propose that disciplinary action be 
taken against the state agencies and public organizations that violate the law or commit negli-
gence in the performance of their duties.
The Organization Law of the People’s Government of the People’s Republic of 
China published on the same day stated that the Government Administration Council 
is responsible for establishing the People’s Supervisory Commission. The Organic Law 
of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, as adopted at the Second Ses-
sion of the First National People’s Congress (NPC) of the People’s Republic of China 
on September 1954, stipulated the establishment of the State Council and replaced 
the People’s Supervisory Commission of the Government Administration Council with 
the Ministry of Supervision of the State Council. The Sixth NPC passed a resolution to 
restore the state administrative supervision system on December 2, 1986. The Ministry 
of Supervision was officially set up on July 1, 19879. It can be seen from above, the 
term “jian cha (supervision)” refers to the power of supervision exercised internally 
by the administrative bodies. It has been a long-standing political practice in China to 
make reference to the agencies dedicated to conducting administrative supervision 
as supervisory bodies. In this regard, the constitutional text prior to the amendment is 
considered to be consistent with the political practice in China.
From the pilot reform plan that is developed for the supervisory system to the 
comprehensive enforcement of the reform, a comparison between the content of the 
reform and the relevant provisions of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China 
clearly shows that the reform plan is contradictory to the constitutional norms, whether 
semantically, from the interpretive perspective of the Constitution, or factually, from the 
actual distribution of powers among the state agencies. Due to the strong normative 
force, these relevant constitutional provisions are inevitably targeted for constitutional 
amendment following the comprehensive enforcement of the pilot reform plan. There-
fore, the Amendments to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (2018) are 
actually reflective of this.
supervision of the People’s courts (Article 104), the legal supervision of the People’s procuratorates (Ar-
ticle 129).
8 Cihai defines “jian cha” as: to supervise the work of state organs and staff at all levels and accuse 
the authorities or staff who violate laws or are derelict; “jian du” is interpreted as: to supervise a person who 
does supervisory work.
9 See: 纪亚光. 我国国家行政监察制度的历史演进//中国政党干部论坛.2017. № 2.页28 [Ji Yaguang. 
The Historical Development of China’s National Administrative Supervision System // Chinese Cadres Trib-
une. 2017. No. 2. P. 28].
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1.2. The constitutionality of the reform plan needs to be judged authorita-
tively by constitutional interpretation. At the start of 2014, the Second Session of 
the Central Reform Leading Group decided for the Opinions on Deepening Reforms to 
the Judicial System and Social System and Its Division of Implementation. This docu-
ment set out the objective and principles for facilitating in-depth reform to the judicial 
system, and it finalized a road-map and timetable for reforms. Fundamental and sys-
temic measures of judicial system reform are aimed at improving the classified manage-
ment of judicial personnel, strengthening the judicial responsibility system, improving 
job security for judicial personnel, and ensuring uniform management of personnel and 
property across local courts and prosecutors below the provincial level. The reform to 
the judicial system has been implemented across the country after five provinces and 
one city were designated as the pilot areas. Based on the requirements of the reform, a 
series of amendments were made to the Organic Law of the People’s Courts of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China, the Organic Law of the People’s Procuratorates of the People’s 
Republic of China, the Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China, 
the Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Criminal Procedure Law 
of the People’s Republic of China, Judges Law of the People’ s Republic of China, and 
Public Procurators Law of the People’s Republic of China between 2017  and 2019. In 
doing so, the aims of the reforms are realized from a legal perspective.
The reform to the judicial system has transformed the way in which judges and 
prosecutors are selected and appointed. The committee for selection and appointment 
of judges and prosecutors is set up for all provinces and the disciplinary committee is 
clearly obliged for the selection and promotion of judges and prosecutors based on 
merit, in addition to giving disciplinary opinions on serious breach of discipline and law. 
Despite the benefit of the committee being able to unify personnel management, it will 
likely result in conflicts with constitutional norms. Since the amendment of 2018, Article 
101 Paragraph 2 stipulates that,
Local People’s Congress at or above the county level are granted the power to appoint 
and remove the chairmen of supervisory commissions, the presidents of People’s courts, and 
the prosecutor-general of the People’s procuratorates at the same level. The appointment or 
removal of chief prosecutors of the People’s procuratorates is required to be reported to the 
chief prosecutor of the People’s procuratorates at the next higher level and to be approved by 
the standing committees of the People’s Congresses at the same level.
The Constitution grants authority for ordinary legislation to appoint or absolve the 
personnel of local courts and procuratorates other than the presidents and chief pros-
ecutors. Current Judges Law of the People’s Republic of China and Public Procurators 
Law of the People’s Republic of China state that the appointment or removal of the vice-
presidents, deputy chief prosecutors, judges, and procurators ought to be made by the 
standing committees of the People’s Congresses at the same levels as recommended 
by the presidents of those courts (or the chief prosecutors of those procuratorates)10. 
10 Article 11 of the Judges Law of the People’s Republic of China regulates, “The presidents of the lo-
cal People’s Courts at various levels shall be elected or removed by the local People’s Congress at various 
levels. The vice-presidents, members of the judicial committees, chief judges and associate chief judges 
of divisions and judges shall be appointed or removed by the standing committees of the People’s Con-
gresses at the corresponding levels upon the suggestions of the presidents of those courts”. Article 11 of 
Public Procurators Law of the People’s Republic of China regulates, “The chief procurators of the local 
People’s Procuratorates at various levels shall be elected or removed by the local People’s Congress at 
the corresponding levels. The deputy chief procurators, members of the procuratorial committees and 
procurators shall be appointed or removed by the standing committees of the People’s Congresses at the 
corresponding levels upon the recommendation of the chief procurators of those procuratorates”. “The 
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The Judges Law of the People’s Republic of China (2019) which will take effect11 speci-
fies that,
The appointment or removal of the presidents of the intermediate People’s courts set up in 
prefectures of the provinces or autonomous regions or set up in the municipalities directly under 
the Central Government shall be decided by the standing committees of the People’s Congresses 
of the provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the Central Government on 
the basis of the nominations made by the respective councils of chairmen. The vice-presidents, 
members of the judicial committees, chief judges and associate chief judges of divisions, and 
judges shall be appointed or removed by the standing committees of the People’s Congresses of 
the provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the Central Government upon 
the recommendations of the presidents of the higher People’s courts.
It addresses the existing appointment problem of courts across administrative 
divisions. It is difficult to ascertain whether the appointment or removal of presidents 
of courts and procurators by People’s Congresses at the same level complies with the 
amendment of laws. This conclusion is to be explained from a constitutional perspec-
tive by the authorities, particularly since the NPC standing committee did not do so 
when the reforms were carried out. Reform to the judicial system requires explanation 
as to whether the creation of courts across administrative divisions is in conflict with the 
establishment of courts as set forth in the Constitution and the requirement that “The 
standing committees of local People’s Congresses at or above the county level have the 
power to supervise the work of the People’s government, the People’s court and the 
People’s procuratorate at the corresponding levels”12. Therefore, the implication of the 
articles of the Constitution lack clarity, which lessens the significance of the regulatory 
roles performed by the Constitution on institutional reforms.
1.3. The reform plan does not violate principles stipulated in the Constitu-
tion. The Third Session of the Twelfth NPC modified and enacted the Legislation Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on March 15, 2015. Its Article 72 states,
The People’s Congress and its standing committee of a districted city may, according to 
the city’s specific circumstances and actual needs, develop local regulations on urban and rural 
development and administration, environmental protection, and historical culture protection, 
among others, provided that they do not contravene the Constitution, laws, administrative regu-
lations, and the local regulations of the province or autonomous region where the city is located, 
unless a law provides otherwise for the development of local regulations by a districted city.
Generically, districted cities are granted legislative power. Such a reform process is 
known as the extension of local legislative power, which demonstrates democratization 
and localization of legal power.
Following the amendment made to the Constitution in 2018, Article 99 states,
Local People’s Congresses at varying levels ensure the compliance and enforcement of 
the Constitution and the law as well as the administrative rules and regulations in their respec-
appointment or removal of the chief procurators of the local People’s Procuratorates at the various levels 
must be reported to the chief procurators of the People’s Procuratorates at the next higher level, who shall 
submit the matter to the standing committee of the People’s Congress at the level for approval”.
11 《中华人民共和国法官法》《中华人民共和国检察官法》2019年4月23日由全国人大常委会修订通
过，自2019年10月1日起施行 [The Judges Law of the People’s Republic of China and the Public Procura-
tors Law of the People’s Republic of China were revised and adopted at the 10th Session of the Standing 
Committee of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China on April 23, 
2019 and shall come into force on October 1, 2019].
12 See: 翟国强. 跨行政区划人民法院如何设立？——一个宪法解释学的视角//法商研究. 2016. №  5. 
页3–9 [Zhai Guoqiang. How to Set up People’s Court across Administrative Division? — From the Constitu-
tional Interpretation Perspective // The ZUEL Law Journal. 2016. No. 5. P. 3–9].
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tive administrative areas. Within the scope of their authority as stipulated by law, they adopt 
and publish resolutions, in addition to reviewing and making decisions on the plans for local 
economic growth, cultural preservation, and public services improvement.
Article 100 specifies that, “The People’s Congresses of provinces and municipalities 
directly under the Central Government and their standing committees may adopt local 
regulations, which must not contravene the Constitution and the law and administrative 
rules and regulations, and they shall report such local regulations to the Standing Com-
mittee of the NPC for the record”. The Constitution fails to provide clarity as to whether 
local People’s Congresses and their standing committees below the provincial level are 
authorized to exercise legal power, with the exception of a provision stating that they are 
responsible for ensuring law enforcement, which actually allows substantial flexibility in 
the distribution of legislative power to local governments. Therefore, the fact that the 
Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (2000) allowed the capital cities and 
the comparatively larger cities (determined by the State Council) to exercise legislative 
power is not in conflict with the Constitution. When the amendment was made to the 
Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China (2000) in 2015, granting districted 
cities with legislative power, it was in compliance with the principle required by the 
Constitution. In sum, reforms are likely to cause neither direct nor indirect contradiction 
of the constitutional provisions since the flexibility for reform is allowed by the principle 
provisions of the Constitution. Reforms are mainly manifested in the institutionalization 
and concretization of the principle provisions of the Constitution.
1.4. The content of reforms is an adjustment which is not specified in the Con-
stitution. Back in November 2013, the Third Plenary Session of the Eighteenth Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) suggested putting in place a national 
security council. In January 2014, the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee made 
the decision to establish the Central National Security Council. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping was 
appointed chairman of the Central National Security Council; Li Keqiang and Zhang De-
jiang were appointed vice-chairmen; and a number of standing committee members and 
committee members were appointed. Whether the National Security Council is a newly-
established state agency, how it relates to other state agencies, and whether it should be 
included in the Constitution was never made clear by either party’s public documents or 
the NPC. Nevertheless, there is an academic viewpoint that the National Security Council 
ought to be mentioned clearly in the Constitution. As Ma Ling explains,
Based on the nature and status of the National Security Council, it needs to be set up 
under the direct leadership of the President of the People’s Republic of China. Here, one sig-
nificant constitutional issue is involved, that is, there is a necessity for appropriate adjustments 
to be made to the existing constitutional provisions of the system of the President of the state. 
In this case, it is recommended to incorporate the associated contents of the National Security 
Council into the Constitution in the form of a constitutional amendment13.
As interpreted by Zhu Fuhui, “The President is once again the central figure of 
exercising state power by constitutional practices. For instance, the President acts as 
the chairman of the Central Military Commission and the National Security Council. The 
constant innovation of practices is conducive to making the state institutional system 
legitimate”14. Putting the National Security Council in place is closely associated with 
the actual power of the President.
13 马岭. 从宪政视角看国家安全委员会的设置//云南大学学报法学版. 2015. № 1. 页2 [Ma Ling. A Con-
stitutional Perspective on the Establishment of the National Security Council // Journal of Yunnan University 
(Law Edition). 2015. No. 1. P. 2].
14 朱福惠.“五四宪法”与国家机构体系的形成与创新//中国法学. 2014. № 4. 页57 [Ibid. P. 57]. 
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This was also the case with the reform enforced to the state supervisory system 
prior to the amendment made to the Constitution. Not only did the reform set up a new 
state agency, the supervisory commission, it also contrasted it with the government, 
people’s courts, and procuratorates. The reform also required the supervisory com-
mission to collaborate with the Party commission for disciplinary inspection, as a new 
state agency and a new form of the union with the party, thus wholly departing from the 
existing provisions of the Constitution. The new state agency is certain to have impact 
on the function and power distribution of original state agencies and to the relationships 
among different state agencies. If the supervisory commission is incorporated into the 
Constitution, it is sure to necessitate many constitutional adjustments15. When the Con-
stitution was subjected to amendment in 2018, the supervisory commission was added 
to the Constitution as a whole section, in confirmation of the prior academic judgment.
If the National Security Council is incorporated into the Constitution, it has a pos-
sibility to cause changes to the function performed and to the power exercised by the 
President, impacting the President’s authority16. For this type of state institutional re-
form, normalizing the Constitution is largely manifested in sustaining the basic power 
relations within the institutional framework of the People’s Congress. The Constitution 
ensures that power distribution among state agencies is coordinated by conforming to 
its principle norms.
2. Institutional reforms have three strategies in response 
to the Constitution
Some scholars mention China’s existing constitution as a “reforming constitution”. 
They take the view that not only does the process of reform strengthen the existing 
constitution, it also ensures that reforms and opening-up policies maintain both con-
stitutional legality and legitimacy through the political constitution structure. As Gao 
Quanxi argues,
The tolerance of the ‘reforming Constitution’ for reforms demonstrates that reforms con-
stantly break from the current constitution or breach some of the specific provisions in the Con-
stitution. The ‘reforming Constitution’ is accomplished by unconstitutional practice as well as 
the subsequent procedural constitutional amendment17.
The relationship displayed between reforms and the Constitution is also described 
by other scholars as “trial reforms and responsive changes made to the Constitution”18. 
Despite this, as stated by Jiang Guohua,
15 郑磊. 国家监察体制改革的修宪论纲//环球法律评论. 2017. № 2. 页136 [Zheng Lei. The Outline of 
Amending the Constitution for the Reform of the State Supervision System // Global Law Review. 2017. 
Vol. 39, No. 2. P. 136]. 
16 See: 马岭. 从宪政视角看国家安全委员会的设置//云南大学学报（法学版）. 2015. №  1.页2–6 [Ma 
Ling. A Constitutional Perspective on the Establishment of the National Security Council // Journal of Yun-
nan University (Law Edition). 2015. No. 1. P. 2–6]; 马岭. 国家安全委员会的法律地位探讨//上海政法学院学
报. 2014 . № 6. 页1–8 [Ma Ling. Discussion of the Legal Status of the National Security Council // Journal of 
Shanghai University of Political Science & Law. 2015. No. 1. P. 1–8]; 从文胜. 成立国家安全委员会的宪法思
考//国防法制. 2014. № 11. 页64–68 [Cong Wensheng. Constitutional Considerations on the Establishment 
of the National Security Council // National Defense. 2014. No. 11. P. 64–68].
17 高全喜. 革命、改革与宪制：“八二宪法”及其演进逻辑//中外法学. 2012. № 5. 页914 [Gao Quanxi. 
Revolution, Reform and Constitution: the 1982 Constitution and its development logic // Peking University 
Law Journal. 2012. No. 5. P. 914].
18 江国华. 实质合宪论：中国宪法三十年演化路径的检视//中国法学. 2013. № 4. 页183 [Jiang Guo-
hua. Substantive Constitutionalism: A Review of the Development of China’s Constitution in the Past Thirty 
Years // China Legal Science. 2013. No. 4. P. 183].
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From practice to rule, that is, from reform to amendment of law, constitutional amendment 
always fails to keep pace with social reform, suggesting that social reform is usually enforced 
with no constitutional provisions taken into account19.
When devising the plan for institutional reforms, policymakers have a full under-
standing of the restrictions imposed by the constitutional text, and they target re-
sponses, for instance, the systemic amendment made to the Constitution’s section 
on state structure at the start of 2018. Such phenomena are indicative of changes to 
the way the state is reformed in the new era. Nevertheless, the consequence of this 
constitutional response strategy remains worthy of discussion and in-depth evaluation. 
Institutional reforms encompass three response strategies to the constitutional text. 
First, the plan for institutional reforms is in conformance to the Constitution. The reforms 
regard the Constitution fundamental and are designed to prevent contradictions to its 
requirements. However, when the implication of the Constitution lacks clarity and the 
NPC standing committee fails to offer a clear interpretation, it is reasonable to apply 
prudence in reform enforcement. Second, the innovative reform signifies the intention to 
amend the Constitution. The reform measures clearly alter the state power structure in 
compliance with requirements set out by the Constitution. The policymakers may intend 
to alter the Constitution and advance the reform in line with the power mechanisms as 
specified by the Constitution. Third, for the sake of continued enforcement, the reform 
measures that transcend the power distribution of the Constitution avert constitutional 
adjustments. The partial reform measures have exceeded the scope of power distribu-
tion in the existing Constitution, yet there is still no clear attitude on whether or how 
pertinent restrictions are imposed by the Constitution. Different response strategies of 
various constitutional reform plans will lead to different impacts on the construction of 
democracy and the rule of law.
2.1. The plan of reforms shall avoid conflicts with the relevant provisions 
of the Constitution. Reforms are supposed to take provisions of the Constitution as 
foundational. However, when there is no clarity to the implication of the Constitution, 
and the NPC standing committee has yet to offer a clear interpretation, the reforms 
must be implemented prudently. In the ongoing institutional reforms, the extension of 
local legislative power and reforms to the audit system are all implemented within the 
framework of their respective organizations and mechanisms without contradicting the 
Constitution. From 2014 onwards, the pilot reform to the judicial system has been initi-
ated across the country. Despite concentration at the local level, the reform exerts a po-
tential effect on the stability of the constitutional framework because of the adjustment 
made to its horizontal and vertical association with People’s congresses, courts, and 
procuratorates. For the professionalization of the judiciary to be promoted, efforts must 
be made to overcome the localization of the judiciary and to maintain judicial justice to 
the highest degree. Meanwhile, the reform to the judicial system is required to improve 
the selection of judges and prosecutors and to facilitate the establishment of People’s 
courts across administrative divisions and special People’s courts. However, such 
reform changes the requirements in the Constitution about appointing and removing 
judges and prosecutors, as well as NPC's supervision of courts and procuratorates. 
Nevertheless, the judicial system reform is initially planned for implementation under the 
context of the existing constitutional and legal framework. Policymakers intend to avert 
contradictions to the Constitution and to laws. For example, the Pilot Implementation 
Plan of the Judicial System Reform of the Court System in Jilin Province stated,
19 Ibid. P. 190.
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We shall implement pilot reforms within the existing legal framework and, when necessary, 
contribute opinions and make suggestions on the legal authorization or the law amendment 
based on the reform process. Before obtaining legal authorization or the law amendment, we 
ought to strictly abide by existing laws and ensure that all pilot reforms observe judicial rules, 
and that they are enforced in line with the law and in an orderly manner.
Despite this, setting up People’s courts and special People’s courts across admin-
istrative divisions in the reform of the judicial system is unlikely to prevent contradictions 
to the provisions of the Constitution. Article 3  of the Constitution of the People’s Re-
public of China (1982) stated that, “All administrative, judicial and procuratorial organs 
of the State are created by the People’s Congresses to which they are held accountable 
to and by which they are supervised”. The term “creation” indicates the source and 
flow relationships among People’s Congresses and other state agencies. Nevertheless, 
other forms of creation in the Constitution and other laws are not as clear. Zhai Guoqiang 
indicated, “after the formulation of relevant organic laws, the modes of creation refer 
to the election and appointment”20. Article 101 Paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of China (1982)  stipulated that, “Local People’s Congresses at or 
above the county level elect are authorized to recall the chairmen of supervisory com-
missions, presidents of people’s courts, and procurators-general of people’s procura-
torates at the corresponding level”. Does the requirement of “the corresponding level” 
only mean that the People’s Congress can only elect the presidents of courts and the 
chief procurators of procuratorates at an equal administrative division level? Differing 
explanations will play a decisive role in the constitutionality of the ongoing reform to the 
unified provincial management of personnel and property and to the establishment of 
courts across administrative divisions. As interpreted by scholar Zhai Guoqiang, “with 
regard to constitutional limits in the judicial reform, China’s constitution fails to regulate 
that all the people’s courts shall be set up directly by People’s Congresses, or specify 
the rank of the people’s courts at various local levels. In addition to the intermediate 
and higher People’s courts, the establishment of other types of local courts is not in 
conflict with the Constitution”21. Nevertheless, not everyone agrees with this22. As a 
matter of fact, the problem is that the NPC and its standing committee have yet to offer 
an authoritative clarification. The Judges Law of the People’s Republic of China (2019) 
specifies that the appointment of the president and vice president of courts be estab-
lished across administrative divisions. This can be viewed as an explanation of this issue 
from a legal perspective to some extent.
2.2. The innovation of reform implies the intention of constitutional amend-
ment. Apparently, some of the reform measures alter the state power structure required 
by the Constitution. Policymakers clearly intend to make amendments to the Constitu-
tion and to advance reform in line with the mechanisms of power designed in the Con-
stitution. In 2016, the Central Committee of the CPC approved Carrying out the Pilot 
Program of Reforming the National Supervision Mechanism to be rolled out in Beijing 
Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Province. Despite having no clear sugges-
tion as to how to revise the Constitution, it clearly states:
As a significant political system reform in relation to the overall situation, the reform en-
forced to the supervisory system represents the top-level design of the national supervisory 
20 翟国强. 跨行政区划人民法院如何设立——一个宪法解释学的视角//法商研究. 2016. № 5. 页6 [Zhai 
Guoqiang. How to Set up People’s Court…] P. 6.
21 Ibid.
22 See: 刘树德. 法院设置的宪法表达//人民法院报. 22/11/2013   [Liu Shude. Constitutional Expres-
sion on the Establishment of the Courts // People’s Court Daily. November 22, 2013].
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system. The objective of deepening the reform to the national supervisory system is to establish 
a national anti-corruption agency under the unified leadership of the party.
The national supervisory system gives priority to organizational and institutional 
innovation; consolidates anti-corruption resources and forces; widens the scope of 
supervision and diversifies the means of supervision in order to achieve full coverage of 
supervision over public officials who are authorized to exercise public power; and puts in 
place a centralized, unified, authoritative, and efficient supervisory system. The nature 
and purpose of the reform, such as significant reform of the political system in relation 
to innovation and the overall organizational and institutional situation, indicate that the 
policymakers initiating the reform have paid close attention to the potential impact made 
by the reform measures on the Constitution and laws and are fully prepared both politi-
cally and legally. As indicated by Professor Ma Huaide,
The reform has reinforced the constitutional status of the supervisory agency significantly 
and provided it with new constitutional attributes, which require confirmation by revising the 
Constitution. Moreover, when cracking down on abuse-of-power crimes, such as corruption 
and malfeasance, in the process of conducting supervision, investigation, and disposition, the 
supervisory commission needs to adhere to Article 135 of the Constitution of the People’s Re-
public of China (1982), that is, ‘The people’s courts, the people’s procuratorates and the public 
security organs shall, in handling criminal cases, divide their functions, each taking responsibil-
ity for its own work, and they shall coordinate their efforts and check each other to ensure the 
correct and effective enforcement of the law.’ Their relations shall be clarified by amending the 
Constitution23.
Undoubtedly the Constitution needs to be amended when the supervisory com-
mission is set up. The question remains as to when to make the amendment and how 
to cope with the lack of constitutional basis beforehand. Different response strategies 
tend to exert different effects. Based on the practices of constitutional amendment in 
China, as argued by Wang Zhaoguo, “Amending the relevant provisions in the Consti-
tution if one social system has been validated as mature in practice, has the need to 
be governed by the Constitution and has to be altered. No amendment of articles that 
are not of much value to amend, or articles that can be clarified by the constitutional 
interpretation”24. It is the political choice of the institutional reform that the Constitution 
text lags behind reform practices in a certain period of time. However, the era when 
the Constitution is completely disregarded has passed. For example, the existing pilot 
reform to the supervisory system was approved by the NPC standing committee under 
the framework of the Constitution. The Central Committee of the CPC rolled out Carrying 
out the Pilot Program of Reforming the National Supervision Mechanism in Beijing Mu-
nicipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Province in November 7, 2016. Subsequently, 
the Decision on Carrying out the Pilot Program to Reform the National Supervision 
Mechanism in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Province was passed 
at the 25th Session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth NPC on December 25, 
2016. The Decision was the first to clarify the background of the mandate,
23 马怀德.《国家监察法》的立法思路与立法重点//环球法律评论. 2017. № 2.页10 [Ma Huaide. Legis-
lative Ideas and Key Points… P. 10].
24 王兆国. 关于《中华人民共和国宪法修正案（草案）》的说明——2004年3月8日在第十届全国人民
代表大会第二次会议上 [Wang Zhaoguo. A Statement on the Draft Amendment of the Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of China (At the 2nd Session of the 10th National People’s Congress on March 8, 
2004)] Available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/zgrdw/npc/oldarchives/zht/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp@
label=wxzlk&id=329508&pdmc=1504.htm (accessed: 25.05.2020). 
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In accordance with the Scheme for the Pilot Program of Reforming the National Supervi-
sion Mechanism in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Province as determined 
by the CPC Central Committee, in order to seek and acquire experience in the promotion of 
the reform to the national supervision mechanism across the country, it is decided at the 25th 
Session of the Standing Committee of the Twelfth NPC that the pilot program of reforming the 
national supervision mechanism is scheduled to be rolled out in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi 
Province, and Zhejiang Province.
Qin Qianhong suggests that translating the political decisions of the party into the 
legal decisions of the NPC provides legal legitimacy for the reform to the state super-
visory system to a certain extent25. This transformation is indicative of the reformers’ 
improvement in respecting the rule of law26. Although scholars, such as Qin Qianhong, 
indicated major defects27, existing institutional reforms have achieved substantial pro-
gress in comparison to the institutional reform enforced in the early stages of reform 
and opening up. The combination of the NPC authorization and the pilot reform has 
become the standard mode under the dual context of deepening reform and law-based 
governance. It is also reflective of the trend for reform which makes a gradual shift from 
“crossing the river by feeling the stones” to “implementing reform in an orderly manner” 
and “having legal basis in major reforms”28.
2.3. Some reform content goes beyond the constitutional framework but 
temporarily avoids constitutional adjustment. Some of the reform requirements go 
beyond issues covered by the framework of constitutional power distribution, so they 
may transcend the norms of the Constitution text. Nevertheless, the implicit power con-
flicts are certain to have a persistent impact on the enforcement of the Constitution. For 
example, one of the major measures taken in the supervisory system reform is that the 
party’s disciplinary inspection agencies collaborate with the supervision commission. 
In reality, the director and the deputy director roles of the supervisory commission in 
the pilot areas are simultaneously held by the secretary and the deputy secretary of the 
committees for discipline inspection. Members are selected from the provincial-level 
commission for discipline inspection, the supervision department, procuratorates, the 
anti-corruption bureau, and other departments. Collaboration between party’s disci-
pline inspection commission and the supervision commission is characterized as “one 
group of people, two departments”.
As stated by China’s Constitution (1982) in the preamble, the leadership of the CPC 
makes no other provisions in the text of the Constitution to express the separation of 
the party from the government. Therefore, the institution of power being generated by 
cooperation between the party’s organ and the government has transcended the scope 
of the state institutional system and its power relations, which is designed by the Consti-
tution. The constitutional text provides no legal basis to address constitutional conflicts 
arising from that co-operation. The Decision made by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress on Carrying out the Pilot Program to Reform the National 
Supervision Mechanism in Beijing Municipality, Shanxi Province, and Zhejiang Province 
failed to address the issue of co-operation. Therefore, as a major reform measure, co-
25 秦前红. 全国人大常委会授权与全国人大授权之关系探讨//中国法律评论. 2017. №  2. 页24 [Qin 
Qianhong. Discussion on the Relationship between the Authorization of the NPC Standing Committee and 
the NPC // China Law Review. 2017. No. 2. P. 24].
26 See: 姚建宗. 中国语境中的法律实践概念//中国社会科学. 2014. №  6. 页157 [Yao Jianzong. The 
Concept of Legal Practice in Chinese Context // Social Sciences in China. 2014. No. 6. P. 157].
27 秦前红. 全国人大常委会授权与全国人大授权之关系探讨//中国法律评论. 2017. №  2. 页27 [Qin 
Qianhong. Discussion on the Relationship…] P. 27.
28 阿计. 人大授权改革：既要授权, 也要监督//公民导刊. 2015. № 11. 页44 [A Ji. Authorizing the Re-
form by the NPC Requires Both Authorization and Supervision // Citizen’s Guide. 2015. No. 11. P. 44].
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operation avoids the norms explicit in the text of the Constitution. The failure to provide 
a normative basis for the co-operation of the party’s organ with the government ad-
ministration reveals that the Constitution’s provisions on the allocation and operational 
mode of state powers remain incomprehensive. How to ensure that all contents of the 
reform are on track with the Constitution and the rule of law, while preventing any ex-
cessive impact of the reforms on the Constitution requires further theoretical research 
and practical verification.
3. Institutional reforms should conform to the mode 
of formal constitutionality
The institutional reforms in China demonstrate respect for the Constitution, but they 
are not restricted by the text of the Constitution. The path for reform even circumvents 
the Constitution, which appears to validate professor Gao Quanxi’s viewpoint that, “The 
constitutional reform has yet to be thoroughly completed during transformation, with 
a long way to go”29. Under the context of the increasing authority of the Constitution 
and constantly perfecting the socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics, any 
institutional reform failing to abide by the Constitution and laws will result in certain 
damage to the legal order of the state, and in turn, will undermine the credibility and ef-
fectiveness of the reform. Over the course of social transformation, reforms have to stay 
current, while improving the Constitution. Nevertheless, the Constitution that provides 
the authoritative structure and stable expectation for the state and its citizens shall not 
be neglected. Any major systemic reform with regard to the Constitution must adhere 
to formal constitutionality as the primary foundation.
3.1. Following the rule of law’s requirement for formal constitutionality. 
Formal constitutionality is viewed as a concept corresponding to substantive consti-
tutionality. In the typology research of jurisprudence, the two concepts, the formal 
rule of law and the substantive rule of law, correspond to formal constitutionality and 
substantive constitutionality in the Constitution. Based on jurisprudence research, 
Chen Jinzhao indicated that the rule of law features formal thought, and the formal and 
procedural nature of law is aimed at ensuring judicial justice30. It is widely recognized 
that formal rule of law has superiority to substantive rule of law. In theory, constitutional 
scholars classify constitutionality into two types for comparative study. First, substantive 
constitutionality represents a theory that is premised on value rationality and practice. 
Second, the theory of formal constitutionalism is, in essence, a theory premised on 
formal rationality and norms31. The restrictions imposed by substantive constitutionality 
attract widespread criticism from scholars as well32. As for formal constitutionality, the 
requirements on the normative effect of the constitutional text are higher. Based on the 
basic viewpoint of formal constitutionality, the constitutional text is the only criterion for 
determining whether an act is compliant with constitutionality, which needs explanation 
through the mechanism of constitutional interpretation. The reform measures exceeding 
the definition of the interpretation must be rejected or justified by constitutional amend-
29 高全喜. 革命、改革与宪制:“八二宪法”及其演进逻辑//中外法学. 2012. № 5. 页926 [Gao Quanxi. 
Revolution, Reform and Constitution: the 1982 Constitution and its development logic // Peking University 
Law Journal. 2012. No. 5. P. 926].
30 陈金钊. 实质法治思维路径的风险及其矫正//清华法学. 2012. № 4. 页67 [Chen Jinzhao. The Risk 
and Correction of Substantive Legal Thinking // Tsinghua Law Review. 2012. No. 4. P. 67].
31 江国华. 实质合宪论: 中国宪法三十年演化路径的检视//中国法学. 2013. № 4. 页180 [Jiang Guohua. 
Substantive Constitutionalism. P. 180].
32 Ibid. P. 190.
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ment. In the long process of constitutional amendment, the mechanism for constitu-
tional power operation can be applied to create institutional space for reform.
From the perspective of formal constitutionality, an act must be constrained by the 
Constitution, and if it goes beyond the constitutional interpretation of the relevant text, it 
transcends the limits of the Constitution. Nevertheless, breaking beyond the boundaries 
of the Constitution should not be regarded entirely as an absolute breach of the Consti-
tution. Otherwise the Constitution would be excessively rigid and lose its adaptability to 
social changes. In fact, when first developing the Constitution, policymakers envisaged 
such circumstances where the text would be surpassed by social development, where 
the text overlooks the norms of certain social relations, where the obsolete system is 
transformed into a new system, where the long-standing constitutional view changes to 
a new perspective, and so on. Therefore, all constitutions are designed with procedures 
for constitutional amendment to ensure its long-term applicability.
Apart from that, before and during amendment made to the Constitution, there 
remain mechanisms that allow certain necessary reforms to avoid any constitutional 
judgment for the time being. For example, the NPC and its standing committee au-
thorize the reform to be enforced using the legislative power or the decisive power on 
the vital items, thus setting up a relatively closed “special constitutional zone” for the 
reform. As a prominent contemporary American critical jurist, Mark Tushnet stated in 
Why the Constitution Matters, “The Constitution matters because it provides the struc-
ture through which we act politically to get our representatives to enact statutes that will 
become part of the Constitution outside the Constitution”33. The structure mentioned by 
Tushnet refers to the political structure where state power operates, and the so-called 
Constitution outside of the Constitution refers to other legislation and systems funda-
mentally crucial to the development of the state and society34. It is revealed that when 
there is the need for the reform to break through the norms of the Constitution, it is not 
necessary to scrap the Constitution or enforce reform by violating it. Instead, seeking 
support from the power operation mode of constitutionality to make institutional space 
for reforms is regarded as the institutional setting for modern legal structure.
China’s existing constitution has been revised five times with 52  amendments 
having been published, indicating that the text is quite fitting in society. Being viewed 
as the fundamental law of the socialist legal system with Chinese characteristics, the 
Constitution deserves respect to the highest degree. The so-called formal constitution-
ality requires no conformance to all the requirements of the Constitution, but endorses 
amendment strictly in line with the rules and procedures specified in the Constitution, 
and it bans institutional reforms that fail to comply with the Constitution. Formal con-
stitutionality is opposed to the ex-post confirmation mode of responsive constitutional 
amendment. As interpreted by Jiang Guohua, “The fragmented results of the tentative 
reform are capable of being filtered, selected, and integrated into the constitutional 
track, thus obtaining universal significance”35. Formal constitutionality requires that 
when exceeding the current legal system, the systemic reform should be enforced in 
line with the procedural rules of the Constitution, with the Constitution being eventually 
amended.
3.2. Adhering to the concept of prudent institutional reforms. The implicit 
institutional ethics of the institutional reform mode with formal constitutionality as the 
foundation represent the concept of prudent institutional reform. One of the most 
33 Tushnet M. Why the Constitution Matters. Yale University Press, 2010. P. 8.
34 Ibid. P. 6.
35 江国华. 实质合宪论: 中国宪法三十年演化路径的检视//中国法学. 2013. № 4. 页181 [Jiang Guohua. 
Substantive Constitutionalism. P. 181].
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prominent functions performed by the Constitution is to ensure that any institutional 
reform with long-term influence is carried out after careful and adequately democratic 
consultation by setting democratic procedures and legal boundaries for exercising 
state power, thus ensuring the stability of the country as a whole and the predictability 
of future life. Prudent institutional reforms are the requirement of the rule of law and 
the institutional guarantee offered by the Constitution for future development. Pressing 
reform should also abide by prudent institutional reform.
The concept of prudent institutional reforms involves three standards. First, insti-
tutional reforms should adhere to the democratic consultation procedures within the 
institutional framework of the People’s Congresses. The system of People’s Congresses 
is viewed as a constitutionalized and legalized framework of power operation. It provides 
the institutional basis for the legitimacy of reforms that adjust relations between the 
power distribution structure and pluralistic social interests. Second, institutional reform 
must fully respect and be compliant with other relevant constitutional and statutory 
procedures. Seemingly, this action often increases the cost of reform; the initiation of 
the procedure to amend the Constitution or the law; the proposal and deliberation of 
the draft; the strict voting and adoption; and other factors are costly in terms of time, 
mobilization expenses, and effect on the balance of pluralistic interests. From a long-
term perspective, however, the political, economic, and social risks of radical reform 
measures can be prevented by maintaining full respect for the rule of law. Third, insti-
tutional reform should fully respect the wishes and interests of the general public. On 
the surface, institutional reforms address the issue of redistribution of state power. The 
immediate purpose is to meet the institutional objectives of power supervision, judicial 
justice, and democratic legislation. However, the ultimate purpose is to establish a 
more reasonable power structure to practice popular sovereignty. Without the premise 
of human rights, reform is unrealistic. Therefore, institutional reforms ought to take the 
will of the people and the protection of human rights as the standards for the success 
of the reform.
3.3. Insisting on coordination and unity of the structure of state power 
allocation. Over the course of institutional reformation, there have been multiple 
overlapping reform plans and constant revision in advancement of those plans. For ex-
ample, the reform to the supervisory system that was initiated at the end of 2016 made 
certain changes to the reforms of the judicial system that had already begun in 2014, 
manifested in the major adjustment made to the power distribution of the procurato-
rial organ. Therefore, that reform had to be planned all over again. In fact, institutional 
reforms have encompassed the main areas of state power distribution. Despite this, the 
overall reform blueprint has yet to be fully demonstrated. In this context, we should es-
pecially adhere to the coordination and unity of the structure of state power distribution 
as required by the Constitution. Clarifying the nature of the power of the newly estab-
lished state agencies is conducive to theoretically preparing for deployment of modern 
mechanisms of state power restriction, thus giving comprehensive consideration and 
reasonable adjustment to the relationships among state agencies within the framework 
of the People’s Congress system.
After making amendment to the Constitution, the supervisory commission has a 
duty as the supervisory agency of the state. The Supervision Law of the People’s Re-
public of China (2018) defines the supervisory commission that, “Supervisory commis-
sions at all levels are the specialized organs responsible for exercising state supervisory 
functions. They shall, in accordance with this Law, conduct supervision of public officials 
exercising public power, investigate duty-related violations and crimes, build integrity 
and carry out the anti-corruption work, and maintain the dignity of the Constitution 
and the law”. As stipulated by the Constitution and the supervision law, “Supervisory 
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commissions shall independently exercise the supervisory power in accordance with 
the law, free from interference by any administrative organ, public organization or in-
dividual”. Supervisory organs are clearly not legislative, administrative, or judicial. The 
establishment of the supervisory commission has changed the institutional framework 
of “the government, people’s court, and people’s procuratorate”, which has long been 
established in China. However, will it make changes to the modern system of power 
distribution among legislative, executive, and judicial powers when it is unclear whether 
the power of the newly established supervisory commission is legislative, executive, 
judicial, or a new kind of power altogether.
The answer to this question will play a crucial role in the relationship among the 
supervision commission and other state organs, with regard to the power limitations of 
the supervision commission, the organizational structure inside the supervision com-
mission, and the way the supervisory power is exercised by the supervision commission 
in particular. When the reform to the supervisory system first began, Wang Qishan, as 
leader of the central leading group for the pilot program for reform of the national su-
pervision mechanism, described the supervision commission as an organ of supervision 
and law-enforcement. He indicated that the supervisory commission is, in essence, an 
anti-corruption agency and as a supervision and law-enforcement organ, it works in 
concert with the discipline inspection commission to achieve full supervision coverage 
over all public officials authorized to exercise public power. The pilot program is unlikely 
to determine the nature of the supervisory commission’s power based simply on how 
the supervision and law-enforcement agencies are defined.
In theory, the power granted to the supervisory commission, as a supervision and 
law-enforcement agency, should be executive in nature. It is comprised primarily of 
the relevant functions performed by departments which responsible for investigating 
and handling, and preventing corruption, bribery, dereliction of duty, and other ser-
vice crimes. There is no dispute that administrative supervisory power is classified 
as administrative power. At present, what influences the theoretical and practical 
scholars to make a clear judgment with regard to the nature of the power granted to 
the supervisory commission is the nature of corruption and bribery, dereliction of duty, 
prevention of duty crimes, and especially the power of investigation as exercised by 
procuratorates. As procuratorates represent the judicial organs in China, this type of 
power is often viewed as judicial power. Nevertheless, the scope of the functions and 
jurisdiction of state organs and the nature of specific powers are not wholly unified. As 
Xiong Qiuhong states, “The investigation power of duty crimes, like other investigation 
powers, is classified as an administrative power in essence. The subject of exercising 
investigation power is mainly comprised of the police, the prosecutors, or the officers 
of anti-corruption agencies. The agencies which are granted the investigation power 
are different from the courts granted the judicial power”36. Distributing the investiga-
tive power for investigating corruption and bribery crimes from the procuratorate to the 
supervisory commission would not directly grant the supervisory commission judicial 
organ status. Moreover, there have been theoretical debates surrounding the nature of 
procuratorial power in the legal field. As claimed by Wan Yi, “There are four representa-
tive viewpoints, namely, the theory of administrative power, the theory of judicial power, 
the theory of dual attributes of executive power and judicial power, and the theory of 
legal supervision”37. Of the four viewpoints, the dominant academic tendency is to view 
36 熊秋红. 监察体制改革中职务犯罪侦查权比较研究//环球法律评论. 2017. № 2. 页56 [Xiong Qiuhong. 
Comparative Study on Investigating Power of Duty Crime in the Reform of Supervision System // Global Law 
Review. 2012. Vol. 39, No. 2. P. 56].
37 万毅. 检察权若干基本理论问题研究//政法论坛. 2008. № 3. 页92 [Wan Yi. Research on Some Basic 
Theoretical Problems of Procuratorial Power // Tribune of Political Science and Law. 2008. No. 3. P. 92].
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the functions and powers performed by the procuratorate, in order to investigate and 
crackdown on corruption and bribery, dereliction of duty, and to prevent duty crimes, 
as administrative powers38.
With clear understanding of the nature of the supervisory commission’s adminis-
trative powers, specific systems of reform to the state supervisory system can avoid 
breaching the state power relations within the framework of the People’s Congress 
system.
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Установление конституционных ограничений 
для институциональных реформ в Китае*
Жэнь Сижун
Для цитирования: Ren Xirong. Setting constitutional boundaries on institutional reforms in China 
// Правоведение. 2019. Т. 63, № 2. С. 257–274. https://doi.org/10.21638/spbu25.2019.204
С 2014 г. в Китае начался новый этап всеобъемлющих и системных институциональных 
реформ. Проводимые реформы включают изменения в судебной системе, национальной 
системе надзора, системе национальной безопасности, национальной законодательной 
системе, системе аудита и  т. д. В  целом эти институциональные изменения перестали 
ограничиваться реформами, нацеленными на внутренний механизм управления каким-
либо одним государственным учреждением. Вместо этого серьезно корректируются 
общее распределение полномочий между различными типами государственных органов 
и подчинение государственных органов на различных уровнях. Организационная струк-
тура и распределение полномочий государственных учреждений претерпели серьезные 
кадровые изменения. Конституция содержит различные нормативные основания для 
проведения институциональных реформ. Некоторые реформы четко связаны Конститу-
цией, некоторые ограничены ее общими положениями, а  некоторые выходят за рамки 
распределения власти, определенного Конституцией. На практике институциональные 
реформы включают в  себя три стратегии реагирования на Конституцию: соблюдение 
Конституции; отклонение от Конституции и продвижение конституционных поправок; от-
клонение от Конституции с уклонением от конституционной корректировки. По мнению 
автора статьи, в ходе социальных преобразований реформы должны оставаться актуаль-
ными, одновременно совершенствуя Конституцию. Тем не менее нельзя пренебрегать 
Конституцией, которая обеспечивает авторитетную структуру и  стабильные ожидания 
для государства и  его граждан. Любая крупная системная реформа в  отношении Кон-
ституции должна основываться на формальной конституционности в качестве главного 
основания.
Ключевые слова: государственные институциональные реформы, конституционная по-
правка, формальный конституционализм, институциональная трансформация.
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